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“We can have democracy in this country, or we can have great wealth 
concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can’t have both.”1 
* © 2016 Phyllis C. Taite.  Phyllis C. Taite (formerly known as Phyllis C. Smith), 
Professor of Law at Florida Agricultural & Mechanical University College of Law, J.D.
Florida State University College of Law.  LL.M. (Taxation), University of Florida Levin
College of Law.  I thank Professor Beverly Moran for comments and editorial advice on 
prior drafts.  I appreciate the thoughtful comments provided by Lundy Langston and Nicola
“Nicky” Boothe-Perry at Florida A&M College of Law.  I also thank the participants at the
2015 Lutie Lytle Writing Workshop at University of Tennessee and the participants of the 
Wills, Trust and Estates Meets Gender, Race & Class conference. I am also grateful to my
research assistants Kristina Musante, Shontay Bridges and LaBrae McMillan for their 
excellent research.
1. Though this quote is commonly attributed to Louis D. Brandeis, there is evidence
that it actually comes from an obituary of Brandeis written by Edward Keating, a Colorado 
congressman and admirer of the late justice.  See Peter Scott Campbell, Democracy v. 
Concentrated Wealth: In Search of a Louis D. Brandeis Quote, 16 GREEN BAG 251, 255– 
56 (2013).  Regardless, “[i]f it is not a Brandeis quote, it is at least a Brandeisian one.” Id. 
at 256; cf. Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, 39 AM. L. REV. 555, 562 (1905) 
(“[T]here is felt today very widely the inconsistency in this condition of political democracy
and industrial absolutism.  The people are beginning to doubt whether in the long run democracy
and absolutism can co-exist in the same community; beginning to doubt whether there is
a justification for the great inequalities in the distribution of wealth, for the rapid creation
of fortunes, more mysterious than the deeds of Aladdin’s lamp.”).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Tax policies that have shaped our tax structure and economic climate 
overwhelmingly favor the wealthy, propertied taxpayers.2  These tax policies
are currently configured to shift wealth and the benefits of wealth in one
direction: To the wealthier taxpayers.  As such, these policies contribute to
the wealth and income inequality that disadvantages the poor and middle
class in favor of the wealthy. 
Over the years, the topic of capital gains preferences has been the fodder 
for much debate regarding the best way to deal with capital gains taxes.3 
Discussions have fluctuated between raising, reducing, and repealing capital 
gains taxes.4 Other discussions have centered on whether capital gains have
an effect on the economy, and if so, how the research supports those 
2. THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40411, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION (2010) (“Higher income households are substantially more
likely to own assets that can generate taxable gains than lower income households. Additionally, 
high income households own most of these assets, realize most of the capital gains, and pay
most of the capital gains taxes at preferential rates.”).
3. Id. (“Some argue that reducing capital gains tax rates will increase tax revenues
by dramatically increasing capital gains realizations.  While the effect of changes in the capital
gains tax rate continue to be debated and researched, the bulk of the evidence suggests that 
reducing the capital gains tax rate reduces tax revenues.”); see also Gerald E. Auten & Joseph
J. Cordes, Policy Watch: Cutting Capital Gains Taxes, J. ECON. PERSP. 181, 182 (1991)
(“While taxing capital gains at the same rates as other income has been hailed by some as a 
major accomplishment of tax reform, it has been criticized by others as one of its main flaws. 
As a result, there have been proposals each year since 1986 to restore some type of capital 
gains preference.”).
4. See John W. Lee, Critique of Current Congressional Capital Gains Contentions, 15
VA. TAX REV. 1, 2–5, 3 n.8, 23 n.88 (1995). 
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assertions.5  It would be difficult to cover all aspects of the issues associated 
with capital gains taxes in one article; therefore, this discussion will focus 
on preferential rates on capital gains as applied to individual income taxes.6 
Tax policies, when viewed in the aggregate, reveal that the capital gains 
tax has been a mechanism to shift wealth to the wealthiest taxpayers.7 This
shift is evident through tax preferences and subsidization to reduce or eliminate 
tax burdens for the wealthy. This Article will add to the discourse by examining 
how capital gains preferences have failed to accomplish the initial goals 
of Congressto encourage disposition of capital property and to generate 
8revenue.
While there is existing literature on wealth and income inequality, and there 
are discussions of multiple causes of wealth and income inequality, this
Article is unique in that it will explore the failures of various historical 
justifications for the capital gains tax preferences and how these preferences
contribute to wealth and income equality.
This Article addresses some of the inequities and offers a multi-faceted
proposal to raise revenue and incentivize preferences for a more balanced
approached to tax policy. First, I advance a proposal that offers solutions 
to shift certain aspects of the capital gains tax preferences toward the middle
and lower class. To balance the costs, I then propose an option to phase 
5. See generally AM. COUNCIL FOR CAPITAL FORMATION, STATE AND FEDERAL 
INDIVIDUAL CAPITAL GAINS TAX RATES (Mar. 2012), http://accf.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/04/1204-15-ACCF-Special-Report-on-Capital-Gains_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/
P35W-94VW]. 
6. Jason L. Hortenstine, Comment, Use of the Family Limited Partnership to Protect
Illinois Family Farms During a Period of Uncertainty: Proceed with Caution, 37 S. Ill. U.
L.J. 195, 204–06 (2012); see also Brian Raub & Melissa Belvedere, New Data on Family 
Limited Partnerships Reported on Estate Tax Returns, in 2 INTERNAL REVENUE CO., 
COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL TRANSFER TAX AND PERSONAL WEALTH STUDIES 374 (2005).
7. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, How Progressive is the U.S. Federal Tax
System? A Historical and International Perspective 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 12404, 2006) (“However, the conclusion that these three changes have
reduced the progressivity of the federal tax system [sic] less obvious than it may at first appear. 
For example, in the case of the individual income tax, the numerous deductions and 
exemptions mean that the tax rates listed in the tax tables might be a poor measure of the actual
tax burden faced by each income group.  In addition, some forms of income, such as capital 
gains, have traditionally faced lower tax rates, which benefits disproportionately high income
taxpayers.”).
8. Economics of Taxation, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/faqs/Taxes/Pages/economics.aspx [https://perma.cc/NLC2-GT93] (last updated Dec.
5, 2010) (“To meet their expenses, government [sic] need income, called ‘revenue,’ which 
it raises through taxes.”). 
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out or eliminate other preferences that primarily benefit the wealthiest
taxpayers.  This balanced approach will allow the government to raise
revenue and change the capital gains tax preferences from a rewards to an
incentive-based system.
Part II of this Article focuses on the capital gains tax and provides an
abbreviated historical background about the preferential rates for capital 
gains taxes. This discussion includes research supporting the assertion that 
the wealthiest taxpayers have predominantly benefitted from the capital
gains preferential rate, and suggestions to limit the preferential rates based
on income levels. 
Part II also analyzes tax preferences of capital income and demonstrates
how policies have failed to encourage the disposition of property to generate
revenue. This Part includes reforms necessary to encourage taxpayers to 
dispose of capital property by proposing policies that remove the benefits 
associated with holding property for long periods of time.  This Part also
discusses widening income and wealth inequalities and how the capital gains
tax has contributed to these inequalities. 
Part III begins with a discussion of the income tax implications of the 
capital gains tax when property passes through the estate.  The discussion
will conclude with the gross inequities associated with capital property that 
passes through an estate to a beneficiary.
Part IV analyzes the best solutions for reforming capital gain tax policies
through the estate.  The proposed reforms will create horizontal equity
between taxpayers who receive capital property via lifetime transfers and
taxpayers who receive capital property via death transfers. This section
also discusses the impact of capital gains preferences and analyze how tax 
preferences on capital income have failed to encourage disposition of property
and reforms necessary to encourage taxpayers to dispose of capital property. 
Part V provides a conclusion.
II. TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAIN INCOME9 
A. Historical Treatment of Capital Gain Property 
Tax preferences, such as capital gains, contribute the income disparity 
in America.10  Capital gain income is generally defined as income derived 
9. The discussion in this section focuses on the preferential rates of capital gains
and dividend income and intentionally excluded deductions associated with capital property. 
10. John Lee, Class Warfare 1988-2005 Over Top Individual Income Tax Rates: 
Teeter-Totter from Soak-The-Rich to Robin-Hood-In-Reverse, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 47, 
51 (2006) (“The distribution per percentiles of individual income classes of individual
taxpayers of such capital gains tax preference benefit has always been skewed sharply to
1020
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from the sale or exchange of a capital asset.11  In Eisner v. Macomber, the
court defined income as “gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both 
combined.”12  At the time when Macomber and related tax cases were decided, 
courts did not distinguish between the tax rates on income.13 
The Court needed to determine the proper timing for taxing capital
income, and it ruled that a realization event must occur before the IRS
could tax the appreciation on capital assets.14  With this ruling, Macomber
validated the deferral of income for capital gains property for taxpayers.
This provides a tax benefit because the taxpayer controls when the realization 
event occurs and therefore when the tax payment is due. 
Before the Supreme Court decided Macomber, and under the original 
Revenue Act of 1913, there was no distinction between the tax treatments 
for different types of income.15  All income was taxed at the ordinary rate.16 
It was not until the Revenue Act of 1921 that capital gains income received 
favorable tax treatment.17  In 1921, when ordinary income was taxed at a 
rate of almost 70%, the long-term capital gains preferential rate was reduced 
to 12.5% for property held for more than two years, and remained at this
rate for many years.18 
the top income reporters.” (citing J.F.WITTE,THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX 88 (1985))).
11. See I.R.C. § 1222 (2012) (providing terms and definitions for short and long-
term capital gains and losses).  For the purpose of simplicity and ease of discussion, unless 
otherwise specified, capital gains property refers to property treated as long-term capital gain
property as defined by I.R.C. § 1222(3).  Long-term capital gains qualify for preferential rates 
in accordance with I.R.C. § 1(h).
12.  Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (quoting Stratton’s Indep., Ltd. 
v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913)). 
13.  See Macomber, 252 U.S. at 189. 
14. Id. at 209. 
15. GREGG A. ESENWEIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 98-473, INDIVIDUAL CAPITAL GAINS
INCOME: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 3 (2006).
16. Id.
17. Id. (“The Revenue Act of 1921 marked a significant change in the tax treatment 
of capital gains income. For the first time, capital assets were specifically defined in the
individual income tax code and were separated into long and short term assets[.]  Gains on 
short-term assets were included in income and taxed at normal tax rates.  Losses on short-term
assets were deductible against ordinary income.”).
18. John Lee, The Capital Gains “Sieve” and the “Farce” of Progressivity 1921–1986, 
1 HASTINGS BUS.L.J. 1, 7 (2005). For a detailed discussion of how the holding period may also
contribute to the income disparity because inherent gain is not taxed until a realization event 
occurs, see Beverly Moran, infra note 134. 
1021




    
   
  
 
      
  
    
  









    
  




   






    
  
   
 
This rate reduction represented a significant change because the stock 
market was doing very well and capital gains comprised the majority of 
certain taxpayers’ income.19  Based on the fact that the wealthiest taxpayers
owned a substantial portion of the capital gains property taxed at the ordinary
rate, high tax rates were did not deter ownership of capital gains property.
As a result of the Revenue Act of 1921, those taxpayers whose income 
consisted primarily of capital gains property experienced a significant decrease
in their tax bill.20 
It is not difficult to determine what may have been the true congressional
motive for the capital gains tax.  For instance, Professor Lee exposes one such
motive with his analysis of those early years leading up to implementation.21 
Specifically, he discusses the “bait and switch” tactic Congress used to gain 
initial support for the capital gains preference.22  When Congress initially 
presented capital gains income for preferential treatment, it used the bait of 
“saving the farm” to gain support for preferential rates, which they knew would 
also apply to other capital property such as privately owned stock.23 
Congress justified preferential rates on the premise that reduced rates 
were necessary to counter the “lock-in effect” that taxpayers caused when 
they held capital property to avoid paying the taxes that realization events
triggered.24  Specifically, Congress used farmers as an example to sell the
idea that preferential rates were necessary for capital property because the
high tax rates were deterring the sale of farmland.25  In other words, Congress 
19. See Lee, supra note 18, at 8 (“During the Roaring Twenties’ boom stock market 
years, capital gains amounted to almost 50 percent of individual sector taxable income.  In
the 1925 boom stock market year, the 12 1/2 percent flat rate capital gains preference benefitted
only individuals with more than $30,000 of taxable income ($313,910 in 2004 dollars) where 
an ordinary income rate greater than the flat capital gains rate first applied.” (citations omitted)). 
20. See id. at 7, n.37.  The data indicates the top regular rate between 1917 and 1921 
averaged in the 70% range.  In 1922, the top rate on wages and other income was 58% and the 
capital gains rage maxed at 12.5%. Id.
 21. Id. at 10. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. (“The legislative history reveals that from the beginning, capital gains proponents
cloaked the true object of their bounty (public stock concentrated in high income taxpayers)
with more popular symbols. For instance, the House floor debate on the Revenue Act of
1921 generally spoke first of high rates blocking sales of farm land before discussing their 
blocking sales of securities.  A decade later the Chair of the House Ways and Means
Committee, recalling that the 1921 introduction of a capital gains rate had been presented 
as having a tendency to permit the break up of large farms, asked what percentage of
capital gains sales was attributable to such real estate.” (citation omitted)).
24. Richard L. Schmalbeck, The Uneasy Case for a Lower Capital Gains Tax: Why 
Not the Second Best?, 48 TAX NOTES 195, 200 (1990) (“The principle distortion created 
by the combined effects of a realization requirement and a relatively high tax on relative
gains has to do with the tax-induced reluctance to dispose of assets.  This is sometimes 
referred to as the ‘lock-in’ effect.”). 
25. Lee, supra note 18, at 10. 
1022
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suggested that, to make it easier for farmers to sell their land, it needed to 
lower tax rates on the profits from sales. However, if saving the farm was 
truly the focus of the capital gains preferential rates, then  Congress would 
have limited preferential rates to the sale of farm lands.  There was no such
limitation.  Instead, Congress extended the preferential rates to securities, 
specifically publicly traded stock, and then further expanded the definition 
to include even more property.26 
In short, Congress justified enacting preferential rates for capital gains
by encouraging the sale of capital assets like farmlands and making it less 
costly to sell them.27  Instead, the property that primarily benefitted from capital
treatment was publicly traded stock.28  If Congress had a valid concern for 
the lock-in effect of capital property, it should have expected that the
voluntary sales of capital property would increase and generate additional 
revenue for the government.29  That did not happen.
Even though the government did not gain any significant revenue, the 
Revenue Act of 1924 further expanded the definition of capital assets by
eliminating the requirement for the asset to be held for profit or investment.30 
This expansion made more property eligible for capital treatment, and the 
wealthy, propertied taxpayers had an even greater reduction in their tax 
liability, which resulted in less revenue for the government.31
 26. Id. at 15 (“More significantly, in 1942 and 1943 Congress extended the preference 
beyond the public stock and real estate investments of high income individuals to benefit 
a wide range of middle class taxpayers who were often the Democrats’ constituent groups,
such as taxpayers with timber royalties, revenue from the sales of used equipment and livestock
and lump-sum distributions from qualified retirement plans.” (citations omitted)).
27. See id. at 9 (“Congress’ articulated rationale for the initial capital gains preference 
was that ‘bunching’ of gain accrued over many years into a single year subject to progressive
rates ‘blocked’ voluntary transactions such as sales of capital assets.” (citation omitted)).
28. Id. at 10. 
29. During the hearings for the Revenue Revision Act of 1932, the Under Secretary
of the Treasury, when asked whether the Revenue Act of 1921 actually led to large landowners
breaking up their land to sell to smaller private owners, responded that “the principal gains 
that have been realized in the last few years have been in the security markets.”  General
Statements: Hearings on Revenue Revision Act of 1932 Before the H. Comm. on Ways and
Means, 77d Cong. 42 (1932) (statement of Hon. Ogden Mills, Under Secretary of the Treasury).
30. ESENWEIN, supra note 15, at 4 (explaining that with the expanded definition,
any gains or losses on residential properties would thereafter be treated as capital gains or
losses).
31. See Hearings on Revenue Revision Act of 1932, supra note 29, at 37 (tracing the
reduction of the government’s total tax revenue after the capital assets were given preferential
tax treatment).
1023
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With continued reductions to their tax liability, the wealthy had more 
disposable income to save or invest in other income-producing property.  On
the other hand, the lower-to-middle-income taxpayers saw no commensurate 
reduction in their tax bills.32  As a result, the benefits of greater property
ownership did not result in the burden of more tax liability. At this point, the
stage was securely set to continue the income shifting in favor of the wealthier 
taxpayers.
By 1938, additional changes affected the rates and holding periods.  The 
Revenue Act of 1921 required a two-year holding period to invoke long-
term status and the Revenue Act of 1938 reduced the long-term holding
period to eighteen months.33 The Revenue Act of 1938 also provided two
alternative methods for taxing long-term gains and losses.  The first method 
provided for including a percentage of the long-term gains or losses in 
taxable income at a normal rate.34  If a taxpayer held those assets for more 
than eighteen but less than twenty-four months, then those assets were
subject to 66.66% of the gain or loss recognized and included in taxable
income at the ordinary rate.35  If a taxpayer held the assets for longer than 
twenty-four months, then 50% of the gain or loss was recognized and included 
in taxable income at the ordinary rate.36 
The second method of taxing long-term capital gains and losses provided 
for a 30% flat tax on the net long-term capital gain.37  As a result, this method 
would apply a maximum rate of 20% to assets held for more than eighteen 
months but less than twenty-four months, and a maximum of fifteen percent
 32. Lee, supra note 10, at 49–50 (“During the first modern capital gains tax 
preference era from 1921-1986, the federal tax law dipped deeply in large incomes through
nominally progressive income tax rates, but for large incomes consisting mostly of capital
gains (taxed at effective rates substantially below the maximum individual ordinary income
rate) such dipping was done with a very coarse grained sieve.  Highest income taxpayers 
with substantial capital gains realization enjoyed a Federal tax effective rate lower than 
that of taxpayers with less income but where the income was wholly or mostly ordinary. 
Vertical equity or progressivity was a farce during this era.” (citations omitted)); see also
id. at 9 (“Undersecretary of Treasury Ogden Mills, who had been a Wall Street tax lawyer
and member of the House Ways and Means Committee in the early 1920’s, pointed out in 
the 1932 Senate Finance Committee Hearings that the real tax burden were state and local
taxes borne by small and moderate income taxpayers.” (citation omitted)).
33. ESENWEIN, supra note 15, at 3, 5 (comparing the Revenue Act of 1921, under which 
assets had to be held for longer than two years to be considered long term for purposes of
the 12.5 percent flat rate, with the Revenue Act of 1938, which reduced the holding period
for long-term treatment to eighteen months). 
34. Id.
35. Id.; Gerald Colm, The Revenue Act of 1938, 5 SOC. RES. 255, 257 (1938). 
36. ESENWEIN, supra note 15, at 3, 5; Roy G. Blakey & Gladys C. Blakey, The Revenue 
Act of 1938, 28 AM. ECON. REV. 447, 452 (1938). 
37. ESENWEIN, supra note 15, at 3, 5.
1024
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to assets held for longer than twenty-four months.38  Of the two methods,
the tax that resulted in the lower amount of taxes payable by the taxpayer 
would apply.39  During the same period, other unearned income and earned
income for the wealthiest income group was taxed at an average rate of
80%.40  Accordingly, the tax savings for the wealthiest taxpayers was 
significant. 
By creating these two methods to reduce taxes on capital gain income, 
Congress again demonstrated a pattern of creating income preferences that
primarily benefitted the wealthy.  In addition, these policies contradicted
the stated purpose of capital gains—encouraging the sale of capital property.41 
Instead, Congress facilitated the lock-in effect by permitting the lowest
tax rates for taxpayers who held capital property for longer periods.42 
By continuing to enact tax policies that rewarded taxpayers for holding 
property longer, it was apparent that Congress had other motives for affording 
preferential treatment to capital property.  By making it easier to qualify for 
capital gains treatment, and providing preferential rates, Congress continued 
to shift assets to the wealthiest at the expense of other taxpayers. 
A few years later, the Revenue Act of 1942 made it even easier to qualify 
for the preferential treatment offered to capital gain income.  This act further 
reduced the holding period to six months but attempted to balance the 
reduced holding period by increasing the maximum tax rate on long-term
gain from 15% to 25%.43  Congress justified these changes based on the decline 
in capital gain revenue.44  It was predictable, however, that capital gains
38. Id. Assets held longer than eighteen months but fewer than twenty-four months
were subject to taxation on 66.66 percent of the gain.  When 30 percent is applied to the 
66.66% of capital gains subject to tax, a maximum rate of 20% is the result. When the 30% is
applied to assets held longer than twenty-four months, the maximum tax rate would be
15%. Id.
 39. Id.
 40. Top Federal Income Tax Rates Since 1913, CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE (Nov.
2011), http://ctj.org/pdf/regcg.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5RA-637N].
41. See Lee, supra note 18, at 9. 
42. HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 4 (“The capital gains tax discourages capital gains 
realizations because capital gains are only taxed when realized.  Consequently, taxpayers tend 
to hold on to appreciated assets they would otherwise sell.”). 
43. ESENWEIN, supra note 15, at 6.
 44. Lee, supra note 18, at 14–15 (“In developing the Revenue Act of 1942, the 
House and Senate tax-writing committees reconsidered the treatment of capital gains for
the third time in a decade.  Citing declining capital gains revenue, they strengthened the capital 
gains preference by shortening the holding period to six months, and provided a single 50
percent deduction for the small taxpayer while increasing the alternative 15 percent flat rate
1025
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revenue would decline when there was nothing in the tax policies to
encourage or trigger a sale or any other realization event. 
While it may seem that an increase in the long-term rate would be a step 
toward minimizing the preferential treatment, this adjustment was really
a deceptive tactic because the holding period was significantly reduced, 
which made it cheaper to buy and sell stock in the short term.  Without the 
reduced holding period, the short-term stock would have been subject to 
a tax of up to 88%, the top marginal rate on other unearned and earned income
during that same time period.45  With these provisions, the taxpayer owning
capital property had the ability to either hold the property for a short period, 
or hold it for a long period and receive a tax benefit. 
Over the course of years, through various other revenue acts, Congress 
has expanded capital gains treatment to other properties such as timber,
land with unharvested crops, livestock, coal royalties, and iron ore, thereby
expanding the concept of capital property.46  By expanding the pool of
property receiving preferential treatment, the government has chosen to 
subsidize certain taxpayers without a commensurate or measurable benefit 
to society at large. 
Subsequent revenue acts continued to provide tax preferences to a larger 
pool of property.  Yet, while Congress has continued to expand the accessibility
of capital treatment, it has failed to adequately demonstrate whether these 
preferences work, why it was necessary to continue preferential rates
indefinitely, and why it expanded the pool of property that qualified for 
capital treatment.  Up to this point in history, it is difficult to ascertain whether 
these justifications aligned with the results. 
For instance, Professor Lee describes the unsuccessful efforts by the
Treasury’s Special Tax Advisor, Randolph Paul, to challenge the tax policies 
that provided special tax preferences in the 1942 Act.47  Professor Lee illustrates 
how Paul’s efforts to challenge the proponents of the preferential treatment
were exacerbated by other tax proposals, including a notable effort to institute 
a flat tax.48 
from the Revenue Act of 1938 to a single 25 percent maximum rate for the high income 
taxpayer.” (citations omitted)).
45. JOINT COMM’N ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION
RELATED TO THE TAXATION OF CAPITAL GAINS 24 (2012), https://www.jct.gov/publications.
html?func=startdown&id=4485 [https://perma.cc/7JED-U3FC]. 
46. See ESENWEIN, supra note 15, at 6–7.  In the Revenue Act of 1943, capital gains 
treatment was expanded to include timber. Id. at 6.  The Revenue Act of 1951 further
expanded preferential tax treatment to sales of unharvested crops, sales of livestock and 
coal royalties. Id. at 7. The Revenue Act of 1964 extended treatment to ire ore royalties. 
Id. at 7. 
47. See Lee, supra note 18, at 17–18. 
48. Id. at 17. 
1026
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In the 1942 Hearings, Randolph Paul provided the most thoughtful analysis of
the capital gains policy to date backed by extensive historical data. He debunked
a long-time favorite rationalization for the preference, that the treatment of capital 
gains and losses had a major impact on the stock market, and addressed the inflation 
rationale.  He presented data, including charts, showing the historical fluctuations 
in revenues from capital transactions reflected market conditions rather than capital
gains tax rates. Nevertheless, conservative Republican capital gains cuts proponents
continued to assert that decreases in the capital gains rate were necessary to increase
revenues by unblocking transactions.49 
Paul provided analysis to the Ways and Means Committee contradicting
the claim that preferential tax treatment for capital gains positively impacted
the stock market and addressed erosions caused by inflation.50  Instead, Paul’s
data supported the idea that fluctuations in capital revenue were more 
attributable to market conditions than the preferential capital gain rates.51 
Based on Paul’s research, the primary purpose of the preferential rates was to
provide a tax advantage that primarily benefitted the wealthier taxpayers.52 
In spite of this evidence, the proponents of capital gains offered the same
justification they used in the past—that lower rates discouraged taxpayers 
from holding on to capital assets.53 Professor Lee also depicts Paul’s efforts
to demonstrate that the disproportionate benefits received by the wealthiest
taxpayers came at the expense of the lower-income taxpayers.54 
In the end, the preferential tax rates for capital gains prevailed and
Congress sustained the reduced holding period.  As this brief look into the 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 17–18 (“In the 1942 Hearings, Randolph Paul provided the most
thoughtful analysis of the capital gains policy to date backed by extensive historical data. 
He debunked a long-time favorite rationalization for the preference, that the treatment of
capital gains and losses had a major impact on the stock market, and addressed the inflation
rationale.  He presented data, including charts, showing the historical fluctuations in
revenues from capital transactions reflected market conditions rather than capital gains tax
rates.  Nevertheless, conservative Republican capital gains cuts proponents continued to assert
that decreases in the capital gains rate were necessary to increase revenues by unblocking
transactions.” (citations omitted)).
51. Id.
 52. Id. at 18. Paul’s most noteworthy contribution at the 1942 Hearings may have
been his “equity argument,” in which he proffered distributional statistics showing that 
wealthy taxpayers were receiving disproportional benefits. Id.
53. Id. at 18. 
54. Id. Paul claimed that “the Bland bill would reduce the taxes of not more than
one-tenth of the taxpayers with the probable result that the other nine-tenths of taxpayers 
would be called upon to pay what the one-tenth saved. . . . From these facts, it is inescapable 
that the highest income individuals had effective rates far below the top ordinary income
rates.” Id.
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early history of capital gains income demonstrates, the stage for income
inequality was set.  Proponents of preferential treatment for capital gain 
income continue to support these preferences despite evidence of rising
income inequality.55  As a result, these tax policies have contributed to income 
inequality as well and overall wealth inequality.
The record reflects that the wealthiest taxpayers have received the majority
of the benefits from capital gains for over ninety years.56 The wealthier 
taxpayers, those who received capital gains as their primary source of income,
have experienced a “freeing of assets,” but not in the way Congress originally 
imagined.  These taxpayers had the opportunity to invest and save with the
funds that would have otherwise been required as tax payments.  Meanwhile, 
the burden of raising revenue remained with lower-income taxpayers who 
paid a greater percentage of tax on their earned income because tax rates
on ordinary income did not decrease.57 
First, this Article proposes to limit preferential rates on capital property
to taxpayers earning $100,000 or less.  Once a taxpayer’s income surpasses
$100,000, capital property would be taxed at ordinary rates.  By limiting tax 
preferences for taxpayers who would not traditionally invest in the market, 
the preference would truly serve as an incentive to bring new investors to 
the market.  Taxpayers who earn more than $100,000 probably do not need 
incentives to invest because this group has historically owned a high percentage
of capital property.58 
One of the reasons the capital gains tax has not generated more revenue 
is because Congress has created, and continues to create, policies that
encourage holding capital property for long periods of time.59  One of the 
55. LINDA LEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42400, THE U.S. INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
AND MOBILITY: TRENDS AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 4 (2012). 
56. JOEL FRIEDMAN & KATHARINE RICHARDS, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, 
CAPITAL GAINS AND DIVIDEND TAX CUTS: DATA MAKE CLEAR THAT HIGH-INCOME
HOUSEHOLDS BENEFIT THE MOST 3 (Jan. 30, 2006), http://www.cbpp.org/files/1-30-
06tax2.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZZ5-P7GE].  In 2005, more than seventy-eight percent of 
the capital gains and dividend income were attributed to households with incomes of more
than $200,000 which represents the top three percent of all households.  Id.
 57. Lee, supra note 18, at 31. 
58. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW CAPITAL GAINS TAX RATES AFFECT REVENUES:
THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE 21–22 (1988). (“Taxpayers with AGI of $100,000 or more (the 
top percentile of returns) accounted for 54 percent of gains and about 9 percent of other
AGI.”); see also HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 9. The data shows that when you isolate stock
from other capital gains property, it becomes even more concentrated with the top income
levels owning virtually all of this property. Id.
 59. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 58, at 49 (“It can be shown mathematically
that even a substantial reduction in turnover (or a substantial increase in the average holding
period) will have a relatively small negative impact on the long-run ratio of realizations to 
accruals, although it has a considerable first-year effect and also lowers the present value 
of realizations.”).
1028
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most compelling reasons to hold capital property is codified in § 1014, 
commonly referred to as the “step-up provision.”60  Under this provision,
the recipient of property passed from a decedent takes the property with a 
stepped-up basis equal to the “fair market value of the property at the date 
of the decedent’s death.”61  As a result, taxpayers who might otherwise gift
certain assets are instead incentivized to hold onto those assets and bequeath 
them.  When taxpayers hold onto capital property, they delay or altogether 
prevent the federal government from receiving revenue.62  History has
demonstrated that taxpayers who own capital property tend to hold that 
property for longer periods of time, rather than disposing of it right away.63 
Therefore, it is counterproductive to provide preferential rates for capital 
property because the capital itself, and the income from it, remains out of 
the stream of commerce.
In a sense, the deferral treatment afforded to capital property discourages 
the disposition of property because a taxpayer owes nothing until a realization 
event occurs.64  In most instances, taxpayers would prefer not to accelerate
tax payments.  Even when a realization event does eventually occur, the
taxpayer will be taxed at a reduced rate if they hold the asset for longer than 
a year, so there is no disincentive to hold the property for extended periods.65 
Congress can further limit preferential rates by implementing a maximum 
holding time for them.  By doing so, Congress can encourage taxpayers to
dispose of capital property sooner rather than later.  At a time when the
economy is still in recovery and the government needs additional revenue, 
capital gains preferences offer an area ripe for reform.  The government 
should implement a sliding scale for reduced rates to encourage the disposition 
of capital property within five years. 
Under this proposal, to receive long-term capital treatment, a taxpayer 
must hold property for at least one year.  At the one-year mark, and up until 
60. Id. at 49–50 (“A much larger permanent tax effect can be attributed to the step-
up in basis at death.  A high tax rate on gains realized during a taxpayer’s lifetime provides
a large incentive to avoid consumption out of assets with accumulated gains and to hold onto
those assets to leave as bequests.”).  For a more detailed analysis of the step-up provision, 
see infra note 131 and accompanying text. 
61.  I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1) (2012). 
62. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 58, at 1.
 63. Id. at 49.
64. Id. at 1. 
65. I.R.C. § 1222(3) (2012) (defining long-term gain as that derived from sale or 
exchange of a capital asset held for more than one year); I.R.C. § 1(h) (2012) (outlining maximum 
tax on capital gains). 
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the end of year three, the capital property would enjoy a maximum tax rate of
20%. For the fourth and fifth year, the maximum tax rate would be 25%.
Beyond the fifth year, the capital property would be taxed at the ordinary rate. 
This proposal would incentivize the disposition of capital property, thereby
increasing the potential for government revenue. 
B. Impact of Capital Gains Property on the Economy 
As previously mentioned, there is conflicting research on whether capital 
gains rates have a positive effect on investment choices.66 On the one hand, 
some research indicates that capital gains rates have no impact on the
economy.67  On the other hand, however, different research suggests that 
the increase in tax rates on capital gain income coincides with reductions 
in wealth gaps.68  Either way, tax policies provide wealthier taxpayers the 
opportunity to increase wealth by reducing their effective tax rates and thereby 
reducing their tax liability.69 Reduced rates on capital gains, coupled with
the pattern of long-term holding periods, have the effect of reducing overall
tax revenue.70 
Because the IRS does not collect capital gains taxes until a realization event 
occurs, historical data should provide sufficient information to determine 
what impact, if any, the capital gains tax has on the economy.  Research
shows that the revenue from capital gains has been a steady 5.2% of the total 
income tax revenue.71  Historical data also reveals that capital gains realizations
and overall tax revenue have not been steady.72  Between 1954 and 2010,
the capital gains realizations have been as low as 2% of the gross domestic
product (GDP) and peaked at over seven percent of the GDP.73 
The major peaks in capital gains realizations occurred in 1986, 2000, and 
2007.74  If there is a common thread between those years, it might inform 
a decision for how to motivate taxpayers to dispose of capital property. 
Hungerford noted that the realization increases corresponded with actual 
66.  Auten & Cordes, supra note 3, at 189–90. 
67. Len Burman, Capital Gains Tax Rates and Economic Growth (or not), FORBES
(Mar. 15, 2012, 1:25 PM), www.forbes.com/sites/leonardburman/2012/03/15/capital-gains-
tax- rates-and-economic-growth-or-not/ [https://perma.cc/BM7V-EHWK].
68. Jillian Berman, Raising Taxes on the Rich Would Reduce Income Inequality:
Larry Summers, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2014, 3:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2014/02/17/taxes-rich-larry-summers_n_4804285.html [https://perma.cc/X9ZS-AHCC]. 
69. HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 7–8.
 70. Id.
 71. Id. at 3. 
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or anticipated changes in the tax rate.75  His report also noted that realizations
returned to normal levels after the transition periods.76 
Because of the conflicting research on the effect of capital gains rates
on the economy, it has been difficult to craft solutions for the economically
unbalanced playing field set by Congress. The justification for tax preferences 
for capital gains property may be better applied to justify tax preferences for 
labor income over capital property.  In other words, by extending preferential
rates to labor income and ordinary rates to capital income, the majority of
taxpayers would have more disposable income to spend or invest. Increased
spending would stimulate the economy and contribute to the national economic 
recovery.  However, Congress has not passed such a law, and it probably
never will.  Therefore, this Article will not focus on eliminating capital income
preferences; rather, I make proposals that will justify why capital income 
preferential rates should be limited to a targeted group of taxpayers. 
C. Who Benefits from Tax Preference Property? 
Whereas the discussion has previously focused on the preferential treatment
afforded to capital property, this Article shall shift its focus to determining 
the true beneficiaries of the capital gains tax.  In 2003, data showed that
capital gain and dividend income averaged 1.4% of income in households 
with less than $100,000.77  In addition, the data also showed that capital gain
and dividend income averaged 12.2% of the total income for households with 
those making over $100,000.78  For households with incomes over $1 million, 
the average capital gains income was 31% of overall income.79 
By 2011, the households in the highest income quintile were receiving
92% of all tax savings through capital gain and dividend income.80 In 2011, 
the effective tax rate for the average taxpayer making over $1 million was 
approximately 19%.81  The numbers are even more distorted for taxpayers
in the highest income quintile who also received at least two-thirds of their
 75. Id.
 76. Id.
 77. See FRIEDMAN & RICHARDS, supra note 56, at 3.
78. Id.
79. Id.
 80. DANIEL BANEMAN ET AL., TAX POLICY CTR. URBAN INST. & BROOKINGS INST.,
CURBING TAX EXPENDITURES 10 (Jan. 2012). 
81. Id. 
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income from capital gains; in that case, the effective tax rate was an astounding
11.9%.82 
Congress applies the highest marginal tax rates to taxpayers in the highest 
income quintiles.83  Capital gains and dividend income are taxed at 
substantially lower rates.84 Ownership of capital property, therefore, reduces
the effective rate of top income earners.85  As a consequence, preferential 
tax treatment of capital gain and other property frustrates the progressive
tax structure.  The effective rates that the wealthiest taxpayers enjoy are 
approximately the same or less than the marginal rate imposed on the middle
and lower quintile taxpayers.86  Because of this distortion, the marginal rate
schedule does not accurately reflect the actual tax responsibility for the
wealthiest taxpayers. 
These tax expenditures cost the government billions in revenue.87 The
figures become even more distorted when considering capital income as a
whole.88  Proponents of the favorable tax treatment argue that such treatment
82. Id. at 10–11. 
83. Internal Revenue Serv., Tax Guide 2013 263 (2013), http://www.irs.gov/pub/ 
irs-pdf/p17.pdf [https://perma.cc/H68T-6XSW] (“The tax rate for a single person is 10
percent for taxable income between $0 and $8,925, 15 percent for taxable income between 
$8,925 and $36,250, 25 percent for taxable income between $36,250 and $87,850, 28
percent for taxable income between $87,850 and $183,250, 33 percent for taxable income
between $183,250 and $398,350, 35 percent for taxable income between $398,350 and
$400,000, and 39.6 for taxable income over $400,000. For a married couple filing jointly
or a qualifying widow(er) the tax rate is 10 percent on taxable income between $0 and $17,850, 
15 percent on taxable income between $17,850 and $72,500, 25 percent on taxable income
between $72,500 and $146,400, 28 percent on taxable income between $146,400 and $223,050, 
33 percent on taxable income between $223,050 and $398,350, 35 percent on taxable income
between $398,350 and $450,000 and 39.6 percent on taxable income over $450,000”). 
84. Id. at 118 tbl.16-1. 
85. Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).  A taxpayer’s effective rate, also referred to
as the average tax rate, is a taxpayer’s tax liability divided by the amount of taxable income. Id.
 86. See Christopher Ingraham, As the Rich Become Super-Rich, They Pay Lower Taxes.
For Real., WASH. POST (June 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/ 
2015/06/04/as-the-rich-become-super-rich-they-pay-lower-taxes-for-real/?utm_term=.cd9c99 
1746e2 [https://perma.cc/4ZQM-PA9U] (“[T]he progressivity of the federal income tax 
starts to fall apart at the upper reaches of the income distribution.”).
87. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, NO. 78-317, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012–2017 tbl. 1 (2013)  Tax expenditures are defined as “revenue losses
attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption,
or deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of 
tax, or a deferral of liability.”  Id. at 2 (citation omitted).
88. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, Pub. No. 4130, TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD 
INCOME BETWEEN 1979 AND 2007, at ii (2011) (“Capital income (excluding capital gains) 
comprises taxable and tax-exempt interest, dividends paid by corporations (but not dividends 
from S corporations, which are considered part of business income), positive rental income, and
corporate income taxes. Capital gains are considered separately and not included in this 
measure of capital income.  The Congressional Budget Office assumes in this analysis that 
corporate income taxes are borne by owners of capital in proportion to their income from 
1032
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contributes to economic growth because it encourages investment in capital 
assets and boosts the stock market.89  However, research does not clearly 
demonstrate a correlation between favorable tax treatment of capital income
and stock market values.90  In addition, research does not support the assertion 
that favorable tax treatment encourages disposition of capital property. On 
the other hand, the following discussion will demonstrate a correlation
between the preferential tax rates on capital income and income inequality. 
In 1979, the top one percent benefitted from the greatest share of after-
tax income, and their share has increased substantially over time.91 The top 
one percent received approximately 38% of all capital income in 1979; by
2003, the top one percent received approximately 58% of all capital income.92 
During this time period, the bottom eighty percent’s share of capital income
decreased substantially.93  In 1979, the bottom eighty percent received 
approximately 23% of all capital income, and by 2003 the same income
demographic received approximately 12.6% of all capital income.94 
The numbers are even more slanted when computed using the top ten 
percent of income earners.  The top ten percent received approximately 67%
of capital income in 1979 and 79% by 2003.95  As the research shows, the
top ten percent has consistently commanded the vast majority of the capital 
income. By 2007, the income disparity between top income earners compared
to the lower income earners was substantially more unequal than it was in
1979.96 
capital; therefore, the amount of the corporate tax is included in household income measured
before taxes.”). 
89. FRIEDMAN & RICHARDS, supra note 56, at 2.
 90. Id.
 91. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 88, at ix.  The report indicates that “[f]rom 1979 to
2007, real (inflation-adjusted) average household income, measured after government transfers 
and federal taxes, grew by 62 percent.”  Id.
92. Id. at 4. This percentage held by the top one percent was the largest since 1979 in
the years examined by the CBO. The top one percent consisted of households with after tax
incomes averaging $700,000. 
93. Id.
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 3. 
96. Id. at ix.  The CBO examined the years 1979–2007 because the endpoints in those
years had a similar overall economic activity because both 1979 and 2007 were years preceding 
a recession.
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Although the United States’ taxing structure purports to be progressive, 
as applied the system is regressive.97  In fact, over a forty-year span the tax 
rates for the wealthiest have decreased by forty percent while the average
taxpayer’s rates have remained approximately the same or have increased
slightly.98  This is important because earned income became more concentrated
during this time.99  Therefore, the taxpayers who recieved the largest wage 
income growth also received the greatest tax reductions, while Congress
shifted the tax burden to lower income taxpayers either through tax increases
or by no corresponding tax reduction.100 
The data from Congressional Budget Office reports between 1979 and 2007 
shows that the average after-tax income, adjusted for inflation, of the top
one percent rose 275%.101  During the same period, the sixty percent of earners
 97. Beverly Moran, Wealth Redistribution and the Income Tax, 53 HOW. L.J. 319, 324
(2010) (“On paper, progressive rates can appear dramatic.  At times, the highest marginal
rate has risen to 90% of taxable income.  Working solely from the statute as written, progressive
rates seem ideal for downward wealth redistribution; but the dramatic appearance of rates
on paper are just part of the story. Progressive rates are applied to ordinary income, including
income from wages, but a lower rate applies to income from the sale of capital assets, such
as stocks, bonds, and real estate.  Progressive rates are more public than real because as income
and wealth rises, sources of taxable income shift from wages to capital gains.  This shift in the
source of income moves most wealthy people out of the high progressive rates on ordinary
income and into the lower tax rates on capital gains.  The result is that, as income rises, tax
rates actually fall.” (citations omitted)).
98. Michael Greenstone & Adam Looney, Just How Progressive is the U.S. Tax 
Code, BROOKINGS (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/ 
downloads_and_links/0413_tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z43X-VPQF].  The chart provided 
demonstrates that for the wealthiest one percent, their rates peaked at around seventy percent in
the early 1970s and after 2000 and dropped below forty percent.  Id.  On the other hand, 
the taxpayers in the 80–99 percentile range saw their taxes increase from just under twenty
percent to twenty-five percent during the same timeframe, while the lowest percentile, the 
0–80 percentile range, stayed approximately the same.  Id.
 99. Id.
 100. See id. (“In 1979, the top 1 percent of Americans earned 9.3 percent of all income 
in the United States and paid 15.4 percent of all federal taxes.  While the share of income
earned by the top 1 percent had more than doubled by 2007—to 19.4 percent—the share of
federal tax liability paid by that group only increased by about 80 percent, to 28.1 percent. 
The share of taxes increased less for this group because high-income tax rates fell by more
than the tax rates for everyone else—reductions that made the system less progressive.”). 
101. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 88, at 3 (“Average real after-tax household 
income for the one percent of the population with the highest income grew by 275 percent 
between 1979 and 2007.  Average real after-tax income for that group has been quite volatile: 
It spiked in 1986 and fell in 1987, reflecting an acceleration of capital gains realizations into
1986 in anticipation of the scheduled increase in tax rates the following year.”).  Moreover, 
“[a]fter-tax income is equal to market income plus transfer income minus federal taxes paid. In
assessing the impact of various taxes, individual income taxes are allocated directly to households 
paying those taxes. Social insurance, or payroll, taxes are allocated to households paying 
those taxes directly or paying them indirectly through their employers. Corporate income
taxes are allocated to households according to their share of capital income. Federal excise
1034
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in the middle saw only a 37% increase, and income for those in the bottom 
twenty percent grew by a mere 19%.102  It is difficult to pinpoint the exact
cause or causes of the significant wealth disparity that exists in the United 
States; however, this Article argues that data supports the idea that favorable 
tax treatment afforded to capital income exacerbates income disparity.  Tax 
policy affects wealth disparity in the United States in a number of ways. 
As the wealth gap between the upper income and the lowest income taxpayers
continues to widen, the impact of this phenomenon concerns society as a 
whole.103 
I have previously stated that taxing wealth at death can combat wealth
concentration.104  However, because of the significant disparity in wealth 
that currently exists, there is no magic bullet that will diminish its effect.  In
order to effectively challenge the concentrated masses of wealth, a multi-
level attack is necessary.  In addition to lowering the exemption levels and 
raising rates on life and death time transfers, Congress must also implement
changes with respect to other tax policies that shift wealth to the wealthier 
taxpayers.
There are numerous factors that contribute to increasing income inequality, 
so it is difficult to pinpoint specific changes to reverse the phenomenon.  
Scholars and economists do agree, however, that two factors in particular 
contribute to income inequality: concentration of market income and tax 
policy.105 
taxes are allocated to households according to their consumption of the taxed good or service.” 
Id. at iii.
 102. Id. at 3 (“For the sixty percent of the population in the middle of the income 
scale (the 21st through 80th percentiles), average after-tax household income grew thirty seven 
percent between 1979 and 2007[.] Average after-tax household income in the lowest income
quintile (the 1st through 20th percentiles) was eighteen percent higher in 2007 than in 1979.”).
103. ISAAC SHAPIRO & JOEL FRIEDMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, NEW,
UNNOTICED CBO DATA SHOW CAPITAL INCOME HAS BECOME MUCH MORE CONCENTRATED 
AT THE TOP (Jan. 26, 2006), http://www.cbpp.org/research/new-unnoticed-cbo-data-show- 
capital-income-has-become-much-more-concentrated-at-the-top [https://perma.cc/JTM3-
WPU7] (“Adding to concerns over the increasingly regressive effects of extending lower
taxes on capital gains and dividend income, the CBO data also show a dramatic widening 
in overall income disparities during the past two and one half decades.”). 
104. Phyllis C. Smith, Change We Can’t Believe In . . . Or Afford: Why the Timing Is
Wrong To Reduce the Estate Tax for the Wealthiest Americans, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 493, 547
(2012).
105. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 88, at ix–xiii.  Market income is income
measured before government transfers and taxes and includes labor, business, capital gains,
capital income and other income such as retirement income for past services and any other 
sources of income.  Id. Even though an increasing concentration of market income was
1035
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Various income sources affect market income, but labor income accounted 
for more than seventy percent of market income between 1979 and 2007.106 
For the bottom eighty percent of income earners, their share of labor income
dropped significantly between 1979 and 2007.107  Furthermore, the bottom 
eighty percent also experienced a decrease in their income share of capital
gains, as well as income from other capital property.108  Between 1979 and 
2007, the share of after-tax household average income received by the top 
one percent increased by nine percentage points, while the household income
from the three middle income quintiles decreased by seven percentage points 
and the lowest income households decreased by two percentage points.109 
Because the wealthiest derive income from the stock market, there are
periods of volatility, but overall there has been a substantial increase in
after-tax income.110  The volatility may also be linked to tax policy; as this
Article suggests, it is no coincidence that major swings in income occurred 
directly after major tax policy changes.  For instance, income of the wealthiest 
one percent peaked in 1986 and dropped dramatically in the following
the primary force behind the growing dispersion in after-tax household income between 
1979 and 2007, shifts in the distribution of government transfer payments and federal taxes 
also contributed to the increase in after-tax income inequality. Id. at ii.
 106. Id. at 10. 
107. 	Id.
In 1979, the bottom 80 percent of the population in the income spectrum received 
nearly 60 percent of total labor income, about 33 percent of income from capital 
and business, and about 8 percent from capital gains[.] By 2007, the share of labor
income going to the bottom 80 percent had dropped to less than 50 percent, their 
percentage of business income and income from capital had decreased to 20 
percent, and their share of capital gains was about 5 percent. 
Id.
 108. Id.
 109. 	See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 88, at 3. Furthermore, 
the share of total after-tax income received by the 1 percent of the population in
households with the highest income more than doubled between 1979 and 2007, 
whereas the share received by low-and middle-income households declined.  The
share of income received by the top 1 percent grew from about 8 percent in 1979 
to over 17 percent in 2007. The share received by other households in the highest 
income quintile was fairly flat over the same period, edging up from 35 percent to
36 percent.  In contrast, the share of after-tax income received by the 60 percent 
of the population in the three middle-income quintiles fell by 7 percentage points 
between 1979 and 2007, from 50 percent to 43 percent of total after-tax household
income, and the share of after-tax income accruing to the lowest-income quintile 
decreased from 7 percent to 5 percent. 
Id. at 3. 
110. See id. The average real income, adjusted for inflation, peaked in 1986 for the 
1 percent of the population with the highest income, and dropped the following year. Id.
By 1988, the income began to rise again but decreased again between 1990 and 1991 due 
to the recession. Id. By 1994, the income was on the rise again and in 1995 there was a spike
and increases in income until 2000. Id.  In 2001, there was a sharp decline in income growth
due to the recession; however, incomes. Id.
1036
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year.111  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 1986) may have contributed to the
dramatic decrease because it repealed the net capital gains deductions for 
individuals and repealed the favorable tax rates for capital gains, thereby 
taxing capital gains at the ordinary rate.112 
Proponents of preferential treatment for capital gains and dividends may
continue to argue that society benefits because it encourages investments
and economic growth.  These proponents have made this assertion for years
with little to no evidence supporting it.113  Because there is no dispositive
factor that causes economic growth or decline, it is difficult to pinpoint the 
impact preferential tax treatment has on investments and economic growth.114 
On the other hand, there is evidence of income inequality that has adversely
impacted middle-to low-wealth earners, and the evidence reveals that these
income demographics have not seen a positive income boost from such capital
gains property.115 
The primary purpose of taxation is to raise revenue; yet, tax preferences 
reduce revenue.116  For that reason, policymakers should base any justification
for maintaining a tax preference on the benefit to the majority, not a select
few. Moreover, if tax preferences are meant to incentivize behavior, then
preferences should be extended only as necessary to influence the desired 
behavior. Finally, tax incentives based on public policy should balance
the benefits of policy with the burden of the expense.  In the case of capital 
111. Id. at 3. 
112. ESENWEIN, supra note 15, at 10 (“The Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed the net 
capital gain deduction for individuals.  Both short-term and long-term capital gains income 
were included in taxable income and taxed in full at regular income tax rates.  Statutory 
rates under the act were reduced from a maximum of 50% to 33% (28% statutory rate plus
5% surcharge).”). 
113. See HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 6 (“While the effect of changes in the capital 
gains tax rate continue to be debated and researched, the bulk of the evidence suggests that 
reducing the capital gains tax rate reduces tax revenues.”). 
114. Id.
 115. SHAPIRO & FRIEDMAN, supra note 103 (“In 2003, the bottom 80 percent of the 
population received only 12.6 percent of such capital income, the lowest share on record 
(with data back to 1979).  As recently as 1989, for instance, the bottom 80 percent of the 
population received 23.5 percent of capital income subject to taxation, a share nearly twice
as high.”).
116. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 58, at 5 (“This behavioral response is
considered the key to the revenue effect.  If taxpayers change their realizations little in 
response to a tax rate change, then an increase in tax rates will raise revenue and a decrease 
will lose revenue.”).
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gains income, the benefit to society at large does not equal or outweigh the 
burden of the foregone revenue.117 
The current tax treatment of capital property fails at both raising revenue
and incentivizing new investors.118  One potential solution is to reassign 
the burden of generating revenue to the wealthiest taxpayers, because this
income demographic has benefitted the most from tax policies for over 
ninety years.119 In order to reallocate the burden of raising revenue, Congress 
should tax certain capital assets of taxpayers earning $100,000 or more at
the same marginal rate as the taxpayer’s ordinary income. 
The second proposal is to set maximum holding periods for capital gain
rates for taxpayers who own certain capital property for at least twelve
months but not longer than sixty months. After sixty months, capital income
from stock should be taxed and treated as ordinary income for any 
taxpayer.  This approach balances the need for revenue with the need for
stability in the market.
While eliminating all capital gains preferences could potentially raise more
revenue, a policy such as this would not suffice to discourage the lock-in 
effect.120  In order for the tax incentive to have its desired effect, there must be
a specific deterrent to holding the property in perpetuity because only a
realization event can trigger the tax on inherent gain.121 By providing a window
for preferential tax treatment, Congress could incentivize taxpayers to dispose
 117. HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 3 (“Overall, capital gains tax revenues have been a
fairly small, but not trivial, source of government revenue. Since 1954, revenue from the 
capital gains tax as a share of total income tax revenue has averaged 5.2%. It reached a
peak of 12.8% in 1986 and a low of 2.0% in 1957. Nonetheless, the 2007 capital gains tax
revenue of $123 billion was equal to 75% of the FY2007 budget deficit.”). 
118. THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, TAXES AND THE
ECONOMY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE TOP RATES SINCE 1945 (2012) (first citing Eric 
Engen & Jonathan Skinner, Taxation and Economic Growth, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 617–42 (1996); 
then citing Charles W. Calomiris & Kevin A. Hassett, Marginal Tax Rate Cuts and the 
Public Tax Debate, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 119–31 (2002); and then citing Martin Feldstein & 
Douglas W. Elmendorf, Budget Deficits, Tax Incentives, and Inflation: A Surprising Lesson 
from the 1983-1984 Recovery, in TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1–23 (Lawrence H. Summers
ed., 1989)); William G. Gale & Samara R. Potter, An Economic Evaluation of the Economic 
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 133–86 (2002); William
G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Economic Effects of Making the 2001 and 2003 Tax Cuts 
Permanent, 12 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 193–232 (2005) (“Some studies find that a broad based 
tax rate reduction has a small to modest, positive effect on economic growth.  Other studies
have found that a broad based tax reduction, such as the Bush tax cuts, has no effect on 
economic growth.  It would be reasonable to assume that a tax rate change limited to a small
group of taxpayers at the top of the income distribution would have a negligible effect 
on economic growth.”). 
119. See supra notes 45–56 and accompanying text. 
120. See Schmalbeck, supra note 24, at 200. 
121. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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of property within a reasonable time, as opposed to holding the property 
indefinitely.
Also, the government could benefit from the additional revenue it would
raise by increasing rates on the sale of capital property.  In order to receive
the added benefit of the increased rates, however, there must be an incentive
to sell the property and a disincentive to holding the property until  a death-
time  transfer.  This leads to the following discussion of the capital gains tax 
and estates.
III. THE ESTATE TAX AND THE CAPITAL GAINS TAX
A. Introduction 
In addition to the income tax preferences for lifetime transactions, there 
are a number of estate tax policies that impact wealth and income inequality.122 
This section of the Article will focus on the intersection between the capital 
gains tax and estate property.  Specifically, transfer taxes affect wealth and
income inequality through § 1014 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), which 
permits any pre-death appreciation on property to go untaxed.123 
This windfall to certain taxpayers lacks horizontal equity because a taxpayer 
receiving the same type of gift in an inter vivos transfer would receive
carryover basis through IRC § 1015, deferring the tax.124  The appropriate
 122. Chuck Collins, Fixing and Expanding the Estate Tax: Intervening to Reduce Wealth 
Inequality, INST. FOR POLICY STUD. (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.ips-dc.org/fixing_expanding
_the_estate_tax/ [https://perma.cc/Q7MM-P8FQ].
123. 	  I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1) (2012). This section provides, in pertinent part, 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the basis of property in the hands
of a person acquiring the property from a decedent or to whom the property passed 
from a decedent shall, if not sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of before 
the decedent’s death by such person, be—(1) the fair market value of the property at
the date of the decedent’s death . . . .
Id.  While this section is widely known as the step-up basis provision, it is possible for 
property to suffer a loss, or a “step down.”  For ease of illustration and providing examples, 
the term “step-up” provision will be used to reference this section.
124. 	  I.R.C. § 1015(a) (2012).  This section provides, in pertinent part, 
[i]f the property was acquired by gift after December 31, 1920, the basis shall 
be the same as it would be in the hands of the donor or the last preceding owner 
by whom it was not acquired by gift, except that if such basis (adjusted for the 
period before the date of the gift as provided in section 1016) is greater than the 
fair market value of the property at the time of the gift, then for the purpose of
determining loss the basis shall be such fair market value[.]
Id.
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way to achieve horizontal equity is by providing similar tax treatment for 
inherent gains on death-time transfers. 
The final proposal for this paper addresses the tax treatment of capital
property transferred through an estate.  For the previous reform proposals 
to be effective, it is necessary to remove the final incentive for those who hold 
capital property as a means of reaping the benefits of a death-time transfer
under § 1014.125 Unless there are tax reforms to § 1014, then all other reforms 
previously discussed would be neutralized because the taxpayer would 
simply hold the property to make a death-time transfer and eliminate the
inherent gain associated with the property.  The first option is to eliminate
the § 1014 step-up provision for estates with less than $5.5 million because 
this would eliminate the concern for double taxation.126 The second option is
to convert the current step-up basis to a carryover basis.  This Article discusses 
both of these options in greater detail later in this section.127 
B. Estate Tax 
When a decedent passes away and leaves property, they have the ability 
to transfer that property to whomever they choose.  For the sake of simplicity, 
this Article will refer to descendants as recipients because they are the most
common recipients.  There is nothing inherently wrong with the notion of 
providing for one’s children or setting up the next generation. All the same, 
transferring property—whether through an estate or lifetime transfer—is a
property interest the government has chosen to tax in certain instances.128 
Congress originally implemented the estate tax as a temporary measure 
to raise revenue to finance the nation’s military conflict against France in the
late eighteenth century.129  In 1916, however, the estate tax became a permanent 
part of the revenue-generating measures, in large part due to World War I.130 
Other scholars have attributed the permanent nature of the estate tax to the
progressive movement and its desire to combat wealth concentration.131 
125.  I.R.C. § 1014 (2012). 
126. For a detailed discussion about the step-up provisions, see infra note 159 and
accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 159, 183 and accompanying text. 
128. See I.R.C. §§ 2001(a), 2501(a) (2012). 
129. See Smith, supra note 104, at 498. 
130. Id. at 499–500. 
131. Id. at 501; see also Nancy M. Annick, The Gaping Loophole of the Step-Up Basis 
at Death: A Proposal to Apply Carryover Basis to Excess Property, 8 PITT. TAX REV. 75, 
81 (2011) (“The justification for the estate tax as a tool of social policy was first employed 
in the White House in the early 1900s, when President Theodore Roosevelt called for a tax on
the transfer of wealth in order to break up large fortunes. The torch was taken up by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt during the Great Depression, who stated in 1935 that ‘[t]he transmission
1040
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Since 1921, the estate tax exemption levels have consistently risen to
include fewer estates while the corresponding tax rates have consistently
dropped.132  In the last decade, the estate tax exemption has increased from
$1.5 million to over $5 million.133  By increasing the exemption levels and 
reducing rates, the government has permitted more wealth concentration 
for families in the highest wealth echelon. The United States must generate the 
revenue lost as a result of these policies through other methods. 
To make up for these shortfalls, Congress will look to middle- and
low- income taxpayers. Congress will either raise income tax rates or will
choose not to reduce tax rates for these taxpayers, even though higher income
taxpayers may use various tax reductions via preferences. The revenue
shortfall may also lead the government to reduce funding for programs that 
primarily benefit middle- to lower- income classes.134  In order to maintain a
semblance of equity, Congress should put measures in place to counterbalance
the benefits received by the wealthy.135 
While the data is unclear as to whether there is any particular remedy to
effectively curtail wealth concentration, one can look to certain tax policies
to determine whether those policies have contributed to wealth concentration 
and inequality. For instance, the estate tax was designed to raise revenue 
and subsequently mitigate wealth concentration.136  In more recent years, 
however, the estate tax has become less effective on both accounts because 
of the increasing exemption levels and reduced rates.137 
For example, David Joulfaian’s research shows that the permanent estate
tax began with a maximum tax rate of 10% and an applicable exclusion
from generation to generation of vast fortunes by will, inheritance, or gift is not consistent 
with the ideals and sentiments of the American people.’” (citations omitted)).
132.  Darien B. Jacobson, Brian G. Raub & Barry W. Johnson, IRS, The Estate Tax:
Ninety Years and Counting 122, www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/ninetyestate.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6P2F-JDN8] (last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
133. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 2010(c)(3)(A) (2012). 
134. Rebecca Safford, Information Asymmetry, Race, and the “Death Tax,” 13 WASH.
& LEE J.C.R. &SOC. JUST. 117, 131 (2006) (discussing why and how wealth inequalities would
be exaggerated by the repeal of estate tax and the effect such a repeal would have on minorities).
135. See discussion infra Part III for specific proposals to make tax burdens more
equitable.
136. See generally James R. Repetti & Paul L. Caron, Occupy the Tax Code: Using the 
Estate Tax to Reduce Inequality and Spur Economic Growth, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255 (2013)
(arguing that the estate tax is a powerful reform mechanism because inherited assets are a 
significant source of income for the wealthy). 
137. See Jacobson et al., supra note 132; see also I.R.C. § 2010(c)(3)(A) (2012). 
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amount of $50,000 in 1916.138  By 1926, the estate tax exclusion amount 
had doubled and the maximum tax rate was 20%.139  Between 1935 and 1941, 
the maximum tax rate was as high as 77%.140  The Joulfaian report further
reveals that between 1932 and 1940 the exclusion amount was reduced to 
$40,000, which allowed the government to collect revenue from a greater 
number of estates.141 
The tide shifted dramatically with the implementation of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 (TRA 1976) and other similar tax acts.142  Beginning in 1977,
the maximum marginal tax rate declined and continued to decline for many
years to come.143  Between 1977 and 2001, the exclusion amount continued to 
rise from $120,667 to as high as $1,000,000; as a result, fewer estates paid
taxes.144  Over time, while the tax liability on the wealthiest has decreased, 
the tax liability for lower wealth classes has not decreased at the same rate.
Understandably, there appears to be a correlation between the exclusion 
amounts and the number of estate tax returns filed.  As the exclusion amounts
increased, the number of tax returns filed decreased significantly.145 
Furthermore, in the years following TRA 1976, the number of transfer tax
returns filed decreased by 45%.146  In the years following the implementation
138. David Joulfaian, The Federal Estate Tax: History, Law, and Economics 2-6 (June
2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1579829
[https://perma.cc/X5SQ-G5GG] [hereinafter Joulfaian Report].
139. Id.  Between 1916 and 1926 the tax rate increased in increments with a maximum
tax rate as high as 40% before the big reduction in 1926. Id.  At first glance it would appear the
rate had increased, but the actual data demonstrates there was a significant reduction in 
rates and exclusion amount. Id.
by Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401(a), 94 Stat. 229. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2005, 90 Stat. 1520, 1872, repealed
In relevant part, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 increased the holding period from nine 
months to one year for tax years beginning after 1977, increased the capital gains rate from 
ten to fifteen percent, and eliminated the step-up basis in favor of carryover basis. 
143. Joulfaian Report, supra note 138, at 2-6.  The maximum rate in 1977 was reduced 
to 70%, and by 1982 was further reduced to 65%. Id. By 1984, the maximum rate was reduced 
to 55%. Id.; see also Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Relief Act of 2001 (EGTRRA),
Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
EGTRRA phased out the estate tax and ultimately eliminated it in 2010 through annual 
reductions, but the tax was automatically reinstated in 2011.  See id. § 901(a)(2), 115 Stat. 38,
150 (“[T]his Act shall not apply . . . to estates of decedents dying, gifts made, or generation 
skipping transfers, after December 31, 2010.”); see also Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 302, 124 Stat. 3296 
(further reduced the maximum rate to thirty-five percent). 
144.  Joulfaian Report, supra note 138, at 2-6.
 145. See id. at 2-6, 4-4.
 146. PATRICK FLEENOR, TAX FOUND., A HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF ESTATE TAXES
IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (1994), http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/
f7c34848582a114133f90711b50b9a3a.pdf [https://perma.cc/37PA-94SY].
1042
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of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), the number of estate
tax returns decreased by more than 50%.147  These reductions in filings shrunk 
the government’s revenue stream.148 
The reduction in tax rates has had a similar effect on the number of returns
filed. Between 2002 and 2010, the maximum annual tax rates decreased
from 50% to 45%, and remained at 45% until 2009.149  The increased exclusion 
amount and decreased tax rates resulted in a dramatic decrease in estate tax 
filings.  For instance, in 2002, there were approximately 121,000 estate tax
filings.150  By 2008, the number of estate tax filings had decreased to an
estimated 46,000; as a result, the estate tax exemption produced its lowest 
number of filings since 1956.151 
Finally, Congress passed the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, which provided a five million 
dollar exclusion for estates and established a 35% flat rate for the gift 
tax.152  This Act represented the largest tax breaks yet, with the exception 
of the temporary repeal in 2010, in the history of the transfer tax.153  These
huge tax breaks came at a time when the nation was operating under a deficit.154 
The reduction in rates, the increase in the exemption amount, and the temporary
repeal all contradicted the original intent of the estate tax—raising revenue. 
These tax breaks also shifted significant amounts of wealth to the wealthiest
147. See Joulfaian Report, supra note 138, at 2-6. The chart reveals that between 1981
and 1986, the number of estate tax returns filed were reduced from approximately 145,600 
to approximately 71,500. Id.
 148. Id. at 6-2. 
149. See id. In 2002, the maximum rate was set at fifty percent, down from fifty-five
percent in previous years. Federal Estate and Gift Tax Rates, Exemptions, and Exclusions,
1916–2014, TAX. FOUND. (Feb. 4, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/article/federal-estate-
and-gift-tax-rates-exemptions-and-exclusions-1916-2014 [https://perma.cc/8CFL-5PQP].
By 2003 the maximum rate was 49%, there was an annual 1% decrease every until 2007 when
the maximum rate was reduced to 45%.  Id. The maximum rate remained at 45% until sunset
in December of 2009.  Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Relief Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), 
Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
150.  Joulfaian Report, supra note 138, at 4-4.
 151. Id.
152. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010 Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 302, 124 Stat. 3296. 
153. Joulfaian Report, supra note 138, at 2-9.  The lowest gift tax rate prior to the 
Job Creation Act was 33.5 percent in 1932.  Id. at 2-7.
 154. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE FEDERAL BUDGET DEFICIT FOR 2010 (2010), http://www.
cbo.gov/publication/25107 [https://perma.cc/C4ZC-CWZE].  The 2010 federal budget deficiency
was a little less than $1.3 trillion dollars. Id.
1043
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taxpayers, at the expense of government revenue, thereby further contributing
to wealth inequality.155 
When Congress initially increased the exclusion amount to $1 million 
in 2002, it marked the highest exclusion amount in history.156  The primary 
difference between the 2001 and 2010 tax acts is that in 2001 the national 
debt was not so substantial.157 Even in 2001, the vast majority of estates did 
not owe an estate tax, so there would seem to be little justification for 
extending the exemption and providing further tax breaks for estates.158 
C. Step-Up Basis 
Section 1014(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that property 
passing through a decedent’s estate shall receive a step-up basis equal to 
the fair market value of the property at the time of the decedent’s death.159 
As a result, property that passes through an estate may escape income
taxation—to the extent of the property’s appreciation—when the recipient 
later disposes of that property.  For example, if property purchased in 2000 
for $100,000 was later transferred to a beneficiary through the decedent’s
estate, the basis would adjust to the fair market value of the property at 
the death of the decedent.160  If the transfer occurred in 2013 and the property
value had increased to $500,000, the $400,000 appreciation would never 
be subject to income tax. 
The purpose of establishing a taxpayer’s basis in property is not to permit
permanent tax relief.  Rather, the purpose is to recover the capital invested
in property before taxing any gain.161  The step-up in basis allowed under 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 2-9. 
157. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, FEDERAL DEBT AT THE 
END OF YEAR:1940–2019, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals [https://perma.cc/
H2CA-L9ZB].
158. Joulfaian Report, supra note 138, at 4-4. In 2001, a total of 121,715 estate tax returns
were filed. Id.
159. I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1) (2013).  While this tax provision is commonly known as the
step-up provision, § 1014 requires the basis of the property to adjust to the fair market value, 
which could step up or step down.  Because of the tax advantage associated with this provision,
most scholars simply refer to this provision as the step-up provision and for the purpose 
of this paper, this author will similarly refer to § 1014(a)(1) as the step-up provision. 
160.  I.R.C. § 1014(a) (2013). 
161. 	  Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1 (as amended in 2015) states, in relevant part, 
[t]he general method of computing such gain or loss is prescribed by section 1001
(a) through (d) which contemplates that from the amount realized upon the sale or
exchange there shall be withdrawn a sum sufficient to restore the adjusted basis 
prescribed by section 1011 and the regulations thereunder (i.e., the cost or other
basis adjusted for receipts, expenditures, losses, allowances, and other items chargeable
against and applicable to such cost or other basis). The amount which remains 
after the adjusted basis has been restored to the taxpayer constitutes the realized 
1044
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§ 1014 conflicts with this purpose.  Moreover, the primary purpose of both 
the estate tax and income tax is to raise revenue.162  The step-up basis
provision is also inconsistent with this purpose.163 
One justification used to support the step-up provisions is the difficulty
associated with recordkeeping.164  Advocates for the step-up provisions claim
that taxpayers do not keep good records and point out that the decedent would
not be available to assist with determining the basis of property at the time
of transfer.  If there were no records or inadequate records it would be difficult—
if not impossible—to determine the basis of property.  Therefore, these
provisions make it easier to establish basis when the property is later
disposed.165 
The problem with that argument, however, is that the same may be said
even if the transferor were alive and had transferred the same property by 
gift.  Although the option to ask the transferor to provide information remains, 
there is simply no guarantee he or she would be able to do so.  Even if the 
problem were limited to the case of bequests, the Internal Revenue Code 
already has a remedy for such a situation.  If there is insufficient evidence
to determine the basis of property, the secretary substitutes the fair market
value of the property at the time of the original purchase as the basis for 
the property.166  In addition, technological advances that track property values
and transfers make these rationales less plausible over time.
Proponents of the step-up basis provisions also suggest that § 1014(a)(1) is
necessary because the government would tax the property twice, income 
gain. If the amount realized upon the sale or exchange is insufficient to restore to the
taxpayer the adjusted basis of the property, a loss is sustained to the extent of the
difference between such adjusted basis and the amount realized. 
162. See generally Smith, supra note 104, at 512–13 (explaining how the government
could potentially generate trillions of dollars in revenue through more efficient taxation
processes). 
163. The unlimited step-up in basis at death has been a cause celebre for tax reformers 
for decades. Referring to it as a “gaping loophole,” they highlight several negative consequences 
of this treatment. See Annick, supra note 131. 
of the donor or the last preceding owner are unknown to the donee, the Secretary shall, if 
164. Id. at 96–97. 
165. Id.
166. I.R.C. § 1015(a) (2012) (“If the facts necessary to determine the basis in the hands
possible, obtain such facts from such donor or last preceding owner, or any other person
cognizant thereof. If the Secretary finds it impossible to obtain such facts, the basis in the 
hands of such donor or last preceding owner shall be the fair market value of such property
as found by the Secretary as of the date or approximate date at which, according to the 
best information that the Secretary is able to obtain, such property was acquired by such 
donor or last preceding owner.”). 
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and estate, if the provisions of § 1014 were not in place.167  In his Note, Marvin 
Blum encapsulates this argument and some of the popular justifications 
for maintaining the step-up provisions.168  Blum’s arguments were timely 
because Congress had recently enacted TRA 1976, which eliminated the 
step-up provisions in favor of carryover basis provisions.169  With modified 
carryover provision election, enacted pursuant to EGTRRA, to address the
temporary estate tax repeal, there is room for a healthy debate as to the 
feasibility of carryover basis.170 
First, Blum argues that step-up provisions are necessary because death 
is involuntary—it is not subject to abuse, it occurs only once, and it is available 
to everyone.171 While death is, in most cases, involuntary, that does not
justify a total tax exclusion attributed to capital property.  Just because a
taxpayer receives property in a death-time transfer instead of a lifetime transfer
does not make it more or less subject to abuse.  It is true that death happens 
once and the transfer itself may be free of fraud, but there are other ways
for the decedent to manipulate this tax provision for the sake of their 
beneficiaries.
For instance, the decedent could receive gifts of various low-basis properties 
from family members, hold the properties until death, and then devise the 
properties back to those original family members.  The only restriction on 
the transfer back to the original owner is that the decedent must live longer 
than one year after the initial transfer.172 
167. These proponents suggest that if the decedent paid estate taxes on such property
and the beneficiary subsequently sold that property with carryover basis, and the beneficiary
sold the property for a gain, then the inherent gain on the property would be twice subjected to
taxation. 
168. Marvin E. Blum, Note, Carryover Basis: The Case for Repeal, 57 TEX. L. REV. 204, 
205 (1979).
169. See ESENWEIN, supra note 15. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 repealed the step-
up provisions.  Until that point, the property passing through the estate of a decedent received a
basis of the fair market value at the time of the decedent’s death.  The 1976 act required the 
basis of property passed through the estate to carry the basis the property had in the hands 
of the decedent.  Ultimately, the 1978 act postponed the implementation to apply property
transferred after December 31, 1979.  In 1980 the carryover provisions were repealed. Id.
 170. See Blum, supra note 168, at 205. 
171. Id. “First, death is normally an involuntary occurrence and, unlike lifetime gifts, is
not as susceptible to abuse for the purpose of saving taxes.  Moreover, the step-up device
is available to all persons and each taxpayer may use it only once.  Congress would therefore 
be justified in treating lifetime gifts differently from deathtime transfers.” Id.
172. 	 This look back requirement is outlined in I.R.C. § 1014(e) (2012) which states: 
Appreciated property acquired by decedent by gift within 1 year of death 
(1) In general 

In the case of a decedent dying after December 31, 1981, if—

(A)	 appreciated property was acquired by the decedent by gift during
the 1-year period ending on the date of the decedent’s death, and 
1046
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There are risks associated with such an arrangement, but they are minimal. 
The property, now owned by the decedent, may be devised as he sees fit with 
little to no recourse for the original owner.173  However, a taxpayer would
likely not make a transfer unless they trusted the decedent, and so this risk 
is low.  Because the timing of death is unknown in most cases, there is also a
risk that the decedent may not survive the year; in that case, however, the 
original transferor will be in the same position they would have been had 
the gift not been made.174 
The look-back period is even less risky when the decedent could make
the transfer to the child of the original transferor without the restrictions 
of § 1014(e).  If the decedent completes the transfer before their death and 
devises the property to the original transferor’s child, the property receives a
step-up basiseven if the decedent dies in the same year.175  Blum’s argument 
is also flawed in that the step-up provisions are not in fact available to 
everyone.176  In theory, step-up provisions are available to every taxpayer. 
Yet, as research has demonstrated, members of the higher income classes
tend to hold capital gain property, and those are the class of taxpayers with
such property in their estates.177  As a result, this tax subsidy is available
primarily for the higher income taxpayers.178  Even if we concede that the
step-up provision is available to everyone, the government subsidy is still 
unjustified for the reasons articulated in previous sections of this Article. 
(B) such property is acquired from the decedent by (or passes from the
decedent to) the donor of such property (or the spouse of such donor),
the basis of such property in the hands of such donor (or spouse) 
shall be the adjusted basis of such property in the hands of the decedent
immediately before the death of the decedent.
173. The original owner may have unclean hands if the transfer was for the sole 
purpose of tax avoidance.  In such a case a judge may not be willing to reverse the transfer
particularly if the sole evidence regarding the motivations for transfer is from the original
owner. The unclean hands doctrine indicates that a person may be precluded from an 
equitable remedy if he was complicit in the disputed conduct. See, e.g., Precision Instrument
Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945). 
174. I.R.C. § 1014(e) provides that if the decedent does not survive the transfer by one
year, then the appreciated property would have a basis equal to that of the original donor 
before the transfer. 
175. The limitations under I.R.C. § 1014(e) do not have the attribution provisions that
would trigger the carryover basis provision if the property is devised to any beneficiary
other than the original transferor, or their spouse. 
176. Blum, supra note 168, at 210. 
177. BANEMAN, ET AL., supra note 80, at 10–11. 
178. Blum, supra note 168, at 210; see also BANEMAN, ET AL., supra note 80, at 10– 
11. 
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Another justification Blum identifies for maintaining § 1014(a) is that 
the Government will tax property will be taxed through the estate tax at the 
death.179  Because fair market value determines the value of the property 
included in the gross estate at death, the estate tax would capture the inherent
gain. If an estate tax was paid on an estate that included the capital gain
property, then Blum’s point would be right because, in a sense, there would
be double taxation on the subject property if § 1014 did not exist. His
argument, however, is unjustified because taxpayers who receive property
through inter vivos transfers must pay for the income tax due on the inherent
gain upon the sale or exchange of capital property.180 
On the other hand, only the top one percent of estates actually must pay 
the estate tax; therefore, the inherent gain is rarely taxed and the windfall 
inures to the profit of beneficiaries of the estate.181  If an estate does not actually 
pay any estate taxes, then the capital property should, at a minimum, be
transferred with carryover basis.  There is no risk of double taxation in these
casesonly a risk of no taxationwhich creates further vertical and horizontal 
inequities.182  Accordingly, if the estate is subject to taxation and it actually
pays an estate tax, the estate’s executor may apply a credit to the income tax
return for the amount of the tax paid, thereby eliminating the risk of both 
double taxation and no taxation.
D. Carryover Basis 
Carryover basis is an alternative to the step-up provision.  Carryover basis
requires the recipient of the property to take the donor’s basis for the purpose 
of determining gain.183 In 2010, with the repeal of the estate tax, the modified 
carryover basis provisions applied for certain capital property.184  Under
179. Blum, supra note 168, at 204–05. 
180.  I.R.C. § 1015 (2012). 
181. See Joulfaian Report, supra note 138, at 4-1. 
182. Mark L. Louie, Realizing Appreciation Without Sale: Accrual Taxation of Capital 
Gains on Marketable Securities, 34 STAN. L. REV. 857, 864 (1982).  “The principle of vertical 
equity requires that individuals be taxed according to their ability to pay.” Id. at 863. 
183. I.R.C. § 1015 (“In the case of property acquired by gift after December 31, 1920
(whether by a transfer in trust or otherwise), the basis of the property for the purpose of
determining gain is the same as it would be in the hands of the donor or the last preceding
owner by whom it was not acquired by gift.”).
184. See I.R.C. § 1022 (2013); see also Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation
Relief Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (authorizing the estate repeal in the year 2010 and authorizing 
the modified carryover provisions).  EGTRRA sunset at the end of 2010 and was repealed 
by the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010 (TRA 2010), Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (codified in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.). TRA 2010 granted executors for decedents dying in 2010 the option to elect no
estate tax and modified carryover basis.  Id. § 301(c). 
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the modified carryover basis rules, the decedent’s basis carried over to the 
recipient, who had the option to allocate additional bases up to $3,000,000 
for property passing to the surviving spouse and $1,300,000 to property
passing to other beneficiaries.185 
Except for these modified rules, the Code requires carryover basis only 
for inter vivos gifts.186 If the Internal Revenue Code applied carry over basis 
to the estate property, it would place the beneficiary in the same tax position 
whether they received the property inter vivos or through an estate.
Furthermore, the government could still collect the inherent gain as revenue 
when there is a realization event.187 
Although TRA 1976 failed to replace the step-up provision with carryover 
basis, there are some lessons to be learned.  Some scholars criticized the 
difficulty in determining basis and the low exclusion amount.188  Since that 
time, technological advancements have made it substantially easier to track
records, and the exclusion amount is now significantly higher.  Even if the 
prior attempt was a disaster, the old arguments will likely fail garner the 
same level of support in the face of these developments.189 
E. Deemed Realization 
An alternative to both the step-up and carryover basis provisions is to 
treat a death-time transfer as a deemed realization event.  As previously
discussed, a realization event is necessary in order to trigger a tax on the
inherent gains.190  Deemed realization is a concept in taxation whereby a
certain event or act that would not ordinarily trigger a realization event is 
deemed to have triggered one.191  Under the current rules, death is not 
a realization event that triggers income tax payable on capital gains property.
Instead, inherent capital gains in estate property receive permanent exclusions
185. I.R.C. § 1022.  The additional basis increase may not exceed the fair market value
of the property pursuant to I.R.C. § 1022 (d)(2). 
186.  I.R.C. § 1015. 
187.  Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 211 (1920). 
188. Annick, supra note 131, at 81. 
189. Id. 
190. See Macomber, 252 U.S. at 211. 
191. Rodney P. Mock & Jeffrey Tolin, Realization and Its Evil Twin Deemed Realization, 
31 VA. TAX REV. 573, 609 (2012) (“The realization requirement generally requires some 
sort of identifiable event prior to gain or loss recognition. Under certain limited circumstances
in the Internal Revenue Code . . .  realization is ‘deemed’ to have occurred even though no 
actual transfer, exchange, sale, or other disposition of the asset has transpired.”).
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pursuant to § 1014(a).  If death were a deemed realization event, the decedent’s
death would subject the transferred property to income taxation when the 
property has inherent gain.
Professor Joseph M. Dodge has defended this proposal.192  He argues
that deemed realization is the better approach because subjecting property 
to the one-time income tax payment is not dissimilar to what happens with
the transfer taxes.193  Professor Dodge notes that by permitting the permanent
exclusion of the capital gains tax under § 1014, transfers at death create the 
type of tax avoidance that people cannot achieve through inter vivos gift 
transfers.194 
IV. BEST SOLUTIONS? 
So far, this Article has focused on various ways the preferential treatment
of capital gains income creates inequities amongst taxpayers and has offered
several proposals to address this problem. Without carryover basis provisions
or deemed realizations, taxpayers have every incentive to retain their capital 
gain property until death.195  By providing incentives to hold the property 
until death, tax policy encourages the lock-in effect.196  While each proposal
has some positive consequences, each approach also has negative factors.
How then, can we find solutions in the midst of these conflicting tax policies? 
In some cases, the deemed realization approach offers the best solution 
to achieve horizontal equity between similarly situated beneficiary taxpayers
receiving similar types of gratuitous transfers.  If beneficiaries receive capital
property as a gift, they take a carryover basis and would be subject the taxation
192. Joseph M. Dodge, A Deemed Realization Approach Is Superior to Carryover Basis
(and Avoids Most of the Problems of the Estate and Gift Tax), 54 TAX L. REV. 421, 423 (2001)
(citation omitted).
193. Id. at 434 (“Deeming realization to occur at death (or upon gift) would pose a 
one-time valuation and liquidity problem, as opposed to annual valuations, and in that respect
would be similar to the federal transfer taxes.”).
194. Id. at 438. (“The tax avoidance would derive not from procuring or accelerating
one’s own death, but rather from the act of holding onto property until one’s death, which 
act washes the built-in gain out of the income tax forever. This permanent exclusion of gain
constitutes a far more serious tax-avoidance result than can be obtained by the making of
gifts of appreciated property to low-bracket donees.”). 
195. See Lee, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
196. Louie, supra note 182, at 864 (“The realization requirement and the stepped-up 
basis at death combine to lock investors into their investment portfolios.  Because taxpayers do
not have to pay taxes on the increase in value of an asset until they sell or exchange it, taxpayers
will resist selling appreciated property even though they may have better available investments,
or are in need of cash.  The investors are said to be ‘locked in’ because of the tax penalty that 
they would incur if they were to sell their property and realize the gains. If the investor
is well-to-do and elderly, the lock-in problem becomes even more acute: The incentives
to hold an asset until death so that the basis can be increased to market value—allowing the
unrealized gain to escape taxation entirely—become even greater.” (citations omitted)).
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on the inherent gain upon a realization event.197  At the same time, beneficiaries
who receive the same type of property from an estate transfer would still
receive property with inherent gain, but would be entitled to a stepped-up 
basis.198  The only distinction between these two scenarios is the outcome. 
When the beneficiary sells the gift immediately, the taxpayer will pay taxes on
the inherent gain.  This same beneficiary may well be in a financial hardship
at the time of disposition and there is little relief for this taxpayer.  For the 
beneficiary who receives a death-time transfer, they would owe no tax upon
the immediate sale of the property.  With rate reductions, tax deferrals and
now tax elimination, it seems that capital gains preferences are “giving away
the farm.” 
This stands in stark contrast to current policies, under which the recipient 
beneficiary of a death time transfer may have no tax due upon the immediate 
sale of the property because the step-up provision may extinguish the
inherent gain. There is little justification for these drastically different tax 
outcomes.  Requiring deemed realization for estate property would treat inter 
vivos and death-time property transfers similarly, thereby creating some
horizontal equity.199 
Deemed realization is not without its problems.  If death is a deemed
realization event, then family members who receive property may face a 
tax that they are not prepared to pay without selling the property.  Congress 
anticipated this problem in other situations and enacted the § 6166 election.200 
This provision permits taxpayers in certain circumstances to elect to pay 
the estate tax over a period of years through installment payments.201 If 
Congress opted for deemed realization at death, it could handle this issue 
by extending the § 6166 election to taxpayers who inherit properties with 
inherent gains.202 
197.  I.R.C. § 1015 (2012). 
198.  I.R.C. § 1014 (2012). 
199. Richard Musgrave, Horizontal Equity Once More, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 113, 113– 
22 (1990). Horizontal equity is one of the most widely accepted principles used to judge 
the fairness of taxes which indicates that people in equal positions should be treated, for
tax purposes, equally. Id. at 113. 
200.  I.R.C. § 6166(a)(1) (2013). 
201. Id.
202. I.R.C. § 6166 (2013).  Under § 6166, an estate that meets all the requirements 
of the statute may elect to pay the estate tax attributable to the decedent’s interest in a closely
held business in up to ten equal, annual installments. Id.  The first of those annual payments
must be made by the fifth anniversary of the due date (determined without regard to any
extension) of the estate tax liability that is not deferred under § 6166.  Id. An estate qualifies
for a § 6166 election if the value of the decedent’s interest in the closely held business 
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Carryover basis also provides a certain level of horizontal equity. As
previously mentioned, Congress does not tax lifetime transfers because these 
transfers are not treated as realization events.  These recipients receive a tax 
benefit in the form of tax deferral because the government assesses no income
tax liability until the taxpayer disposes of the property.  Conversely, if Congress 
adopted the deemed realization proposal, then beneficiaries who receive 
property by death-time transferswhich are also gratuitouswould arrive in 
a worse tax position than the recipients of inter vivos gifts because they would 
be taxed immediately.  In these cases, carryover basis would place these
beneficiary taxpayers in similar tax positions with similar tax liabilities that 
would arise when they sell or exchange the property.
If instead Congress continues to utilize carryover basis without adopting 
the deemed realization proposal, then the beneficiary would not pay a tax
upon the death of the decedent.  Implementing carryover basis as a possible
solution also carries a fundamental challenge.  How long should we allow 
a taxpayer to hold gratuitously received property, with inherent gain, without 
triggering an income tax?  An indirect solution to this problem is to eliminate 
the step-up provisions. By eliminating the step-up provisions, Congress 
can disincentivize holding property until death because a property owner
would not extinguish inherent gain upon their death.  Still, this solution alone
is not sufficient; there should be a point at which the property is subject 
to taxation. 
Because carryover basis is a form of tax deferraland yet another type
of tax preference on property transactions conducted primarily by the
wealthyCongress should limit it to one transfer.  Specifically, I propose 
that carryover basis only apply to the first transfer of the property both for 
gift and estate purposes.  This limitation would extinguish the risk of perpetual
tax avoidance and mitigate the risk of revenue loss. 
With the estate and income tax systems operating under existing rules, 
wealth continues to shift to the wealthy.  By retaining the status quo with
regard to transfer liability, the government again demonstrates that its priority 
is to show preference to wealth-based income over labor-based income.
There is no reasonable rationalization for continuing to operate under the 
current tax laws when more equitable options are readily available. 
exceeds 35% of the adjusted gross estate, the decedent was a United States citizen or resident
at the time of his or her death, and the estate made the election by attaching a full and complete
notice of election with a timely filed federal estate tax return. Id. §§ 6166(a), (d).  If the 
estate qualifies for the election, the estate pays a reduced rate of interest on the portion of 
estate tax deferred under § 6166; that interest is payable annually during the entire deferral 
period, and in most instances, interest only is paid during the first four years of the deferral 
period.  I.R.C. §§ 6166(f), 6601(j).  The deferred tax is payable in no more than ten equal 
annual installments, beginning on a date that is not more than five years after the due date 
of the Federal estate tax return, which is generally nine months from the date of death. Id.
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The final justification in Blum’s Note is that death is a time of grieving;
therefore, subjecting this property to carryover basis is “more vindictive 
than equitable.”203  This may well be the weakest of all arguments.  There 
is no shortage of taxpayers who suffer financially because they are called upon 
to pay a debt, including income taxes for other income in the estate.  Yet, such
collection is not deemed to be a vindictive act in those other circumstances.204 
Under this theory, then, an estate would owe no tax during the time of 
grieving because carryover is still a form of tax deferral.205  The beneficiary 
could sell the property years after the death of the decedent, which eliminates
this particular concern. On the other hand, if Congress adopts the deemed
realization principle, capital gain property that an estate sells in the course 
of its administration should be no more traumatic than any other property 
sold in an estate administration. 
Supporters of the step-up basis provisions essentially attempt to make the
case that the government should not tax capital property received in a death-
time transfer without providing adequate justification for why the two similar
transactions should be treated differently.  In fact, if the step-up provisions
did not provide such a significant tax break, the original holder of the property
may not have such an incentive to hold the property until death. 
If the primary concern is based in fear that families will lose their farms,
then a possible remedy is to use § 6166.  Taxpayers could elect to pay the 
taxes by installment over a period of ten years. That would provide a form 
of tax relief under which both the government and the taxpayer would
benefit. 
V. CONCLUSION
Years of economic policies that favor the top wealth earners at the expense 
of low-income earners have caused wealth and income inequalities.  This 
203. Blum, supra note 168, at 210. 
204. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 691 (2012).  Income owed to the decedent at death is taxable to
the recipient of the income. Id.
205. Under the current rules, death is not treated as a realization event for income tax
purposes. However, there are scholars making the case that death should be a realization
event.  For an in-depth discussion about realizing inherent appreciation in capital assets, 
see Louie, supra note 182, and Jeffrey L. Kwall, When Should Asset Appreciation Be Taxed?: 
The Case for a Disposition Standard of Realization, 86 IND. L.J. 77, 111–12 (2011) (“Although
death has not historically been treated as a realization event, Congress could establish that 
result by enacting the disposition standard proposed by this Article.  The Constitution does 
not impede the treatment of death as a realization event.”) (emphasis added).
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evaluation of our tax policies, as a whole, has revealed that our current system
is grossly imbalanced.  Even though we label the structure of the tax system 
as a progressive system, the reality is that our system, in operation, is
a regressive taxing system.  The benefits and treasures of society flow to those 
of greater wealth, while the burdens of revenue-raising fall to those with 
less wealth. 
Tax policies have shaped the tax structure and economic climate and have
historically, overwhelmingly favored the wealthy, propertied taxpayers.  To
that end, our taxing system has failed.  This paper discussed specific tax policies
that work in collusion to systematically shift wealth to the wealthiest taxpayers. 
By shifting the focus of capital gain tax preferences away from households
with income in excess of $100,000 and adopting policies that provide
preferences to households with less than $100,000, tax policy shifts from 
a reward to an incentive-based system.  Using tax as a method to address
income and wealth inequality is particularly appropriate because tax policy
contributes to wealth and income inequality.
In addition, placing time limits on the capital property by removing
incentives to hold property allows preferences for certain taxpayers, and
provides an incentive to sell the property—thereby triggering a realization
event. Finally, if Congress converted the step-up basis to a carryover basis 
provision, the final step to encourage a realization event, it would seal the
last opportunity to avoid the tax altogether.  In the end, there are a number 
of ways to reach justice by saving the farm without giving away the farm. 
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